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What is the Sound of a Corporation
Speaking? "Just Another Voice;'
According to the Supreme Court
By Linda L. Berger*
Wen

the Supreme Court over5
res itself, and reaches a result
fferent from the conclusions
of Congress, the Executive Branch,
and more than 20 state legislatures, the
Court has the burden of persuasion.
Did the five justices in the majority
in Citizens United v. FederalElection
(2010), meet
Commission, 558 U.S.
that burden? I think the answer is no,
setting aside the question of whether
the majority reached the "right"
conclusion about the constitutionality of limiting corporate spending
in election campaigns. In this essay, I
will explain my answer and address a
related question: did the Citizens United
majority observe the rules of the legal
conversation within which the Court is
but one of the speakers?
To be persuaded by the majority that
the First Amendment protects corporate expenditures for "electioneering
communications" and candidate advertisements during election campaigns,
you must first agree with the majority that corporations are engaged in
"speech" when they spend money
for these purposes. Otherwise, the
"unqualified text" of the First Amendment-"Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech,
...
or of the press"-does not cover what
could easily be described as just another
product manufactured by the corporation.The majority claims a simple
syllogism renders the conclusion certain:
the First Amendment protects speech;
corporations produce speech; thus,
corporations are protected by the First
Amendment. But the syllogism's premises require the decision maker to accept
without question much that is implicit
in the two metaphors on which its logic
depends.The logic depends on the
* Professor, Mercer University School ofLaw.
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assumption that for the purposes of the
First Amendment, corporations should
be seen as "persons" and their spending
of money to achieve some results should
be viewed as "speech." Articulating
these metaphors uncovers some of what
is hidden by the majority's opinions,
revealing our ordinary understanding
that "free speech" is the expression in
speaking or writing of the views of an
individual human being. Because our
ordinary understanding of free speech
is so different, we recognize that it is a
stretch to fit the source of the metaphor,
a person speaking, onto the metaphor's
target, a corporation spending.
That the majority shares our ordinary understanding of free speech is
reflected injustice Kennedy's comparison of the campaign financing statute
to other restrictions on free speech.
The exemplary speakers described in
justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
match this ordinary understanding; they
are individuals (distributing pamphlets
and speaking about politics); media
corporations (publishing books and
newspapers); and nonprofit advocacy
groups (the Sierra Club, the National
Rifle Association, and the American
Civil Liberties Union) expressing their
views on public issues. After describing
these speakers,Justice Kennedy argues
that no one would claim the statute was
constitutional if it was being applied to
individuals. But he fails to acknowledge
the reason why no one would make
this claim: when individuals exercise
their First Amendment rights, they are
"persons speaking," exactly what we
expect when we think of free speech,
with little metaphoric transfer required
to make them fit.
Avoiding the metaphoric reasoning on which its syllogism depends,
the majority conceals the question of
whether the metaphors are helpful in

these circumstances and fails to examine
whether corporate spending should be
viewed as speech. Instead, the majority
assumes that what the statute regulates
not only constitutes speech but in fact
constitutes political speech, the most
favored kind. Early in the opinion,
Justice Kennedy lets his readers know
that they should take for granted that
"political speech" is involved.Writing
about one of the cases the majority is about to overrule, he identifies
its holding as prohibiting core value
speech:"Austin had held that political speech may be banned based on
the speaker's corporate identity." So
too, in his concurrence, ChiefJustice
Roberts characterizes the government's
argument as urging "us in this case to
uphold a direct prohibition on political
speech."
Compounding the generalization
that corporate spending automatically
qualifies as speech, the majority makes
a good deal of the principle that the
First Amendment protects "speech," not
speakers. Dismissing the dissent's argument that protected speech might be
confined to the expression of individual
human beings,Justice Scalia scoffs,
"This is sophistry," and explains that the
corporation's authorized spokesperson is
a human being. But the opposing argument is not that there is no "person"
working at the corporation who signs
the contract or operates the machinery
or convenes the board meeting. Instead,
the opposing argument is that it might
make a difference for First Amendment
purposes that a challenged communication was the product of a corporate
process, rather than the expression of
an individual person.When a corporation "speaks" in this way, no one knows
which corporate employees participated in the process through which the
comnunication was produced or whose
Volume 35, Number 3

views the communication represents; no
one is responsible or accountable for the
content of the statements or the manner
in which they were communicated.'

Only when you accept the inferences
and reasoning processes transferred
by metaphoric reasoning are you able
to conclude that corporations are
engaged in speech when they spend
money in an election campaign. Going
further, the majority's conclusion that
the First Amendment should protect
corporate speech relies on another set
of unexanained assumptions: that the
marketplace of ideas metaphor is the
most appropriate way to think about
how the First Amendment works.The
majority assumes its audience agrees

with this framework, which automatically suggests that the corporation needs
protection from government regulation.ThusJustice Kennedy writes that
speech is so important to the election
process that further regulation of the
market could only be detrimental: "As
additional rules are created for regulating political speech, any speech arguably
within their reach is chilled."Transferring its assumptions about the economic
marketplace to the First Amendment
arena, the majority naturally concludes
that more speech is better than less
speech, that (because money is "speech"
in this instance) more spending is better
than less spending, and that the better
product will prevail.
Nowhere does the majority
acknowledge that the dissent's question deserves serious consideration:
given the language, purpose, and history
of the First Amendment, should it be
interpreted to protect artificial entities
such as for-profit corporations against
government regulation? In his dissent,
Justice Stevens presents the text-based
argument that the Constitution itself
makes a distinction between types of
speakers.Thus, it might be concluded
that individual speakers are protected
by the free speech clause, but that the
only protected entities are those that

'The Citizens United decsion may allow
corporaions and unions to donate anonynously
to nonprofit groups; those groups can use the
money to finance political advertisements, and
corporations and unions may thus avoid the
disclosure requirements upheld in Citizens United.
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fall within the free press clause. Rather
than counter the argument that the text
itself distinguishes between speakers, the
majority responds that it would be hard
to apply the distinction.
As for the purposes of the First
Amendment,most commentators
acknowledge that protecting personal
expression, supporting individual selffulfillment and self-determination,
is among them.This purpose might
be furthered by extending protection beyond the personal to a group
of people who have joined together
for the specific purpose of expressing
their views. But it is difficult to justify
extending protection on these grounds
to a corporate entity whose purposes
grow out of and are limited by its
responsibility to its stockholders.
Rather than meeting their burden of
persuasion, the majority justices repeatedly shift the burden to the dissent.
First, the majority asks the reader to
assume that if a corporation is treated
for some purposes as a person, it follows
(as night follows the day) that a corporation should be treated as a person
for all purposes. "The lack of a textual
exception for speech by corporations" indicates to Justice Scalia that
the natural reading of the First Amendment's free speech clause would include
them. Given corporate attributes that
make the entity very different from an
individual speaker, the majority instead
should explain the lack of any text indicating that corporations were intended
to be included.Writing that "the individual person's right to speak includes
the right to speak in association with
other individual persons;'Justice Scalia
concludes that"[t]he association of
individuals in a business corporation is
no different." But surely it is the majority's burden to explain why there is no
difference.
As for engaging effectively in the
national civic and legal conversation, the majority appears oblivious to
current discussions of corporate roles
and responsibilities, the functioning of a
poorly regulated economic marketplace,
and the excesses of campaign financing. ChiefJustice Roberts assumes his
audience agrees that it would be a bad
thing if"First Amendment rights could

be confined to individuals, subverting
the vibrant public discourse that is at the
foundation of our democracy."Justice
Scalia concludes that "to exclude or
impede corporate speech is to muzzle
the principal agents of the modern free
economry.We should celebrate rather
than condemn the addition of this
speech to the public debate." Given
the current public debate, these statements seem jarring; as the dissenting
Justice Stevens notes, "While American
democracy is imperfect, few outside
the majority of this Court would have
thought its flaws included a dearth of
corporate money in politics."
The majority's tone-deaffess extends
to its expressions of reluctance to reach
a sweeping conclusion, claiming to have
been forced by circumstances to decide
a difficult question. Instead, the majority
appears to have reached out to find and
determine an issue not pursued by the
parties.Though ChiefJustice Roberts
claims that "[tlhis is the first case in
which we have been asked to overrule
Austin,"Justice Stevens responds that it
would be more accurate "to state that
'we have asked ourselves' to reconsider

[Austin and McConnelf."
Reopening the argument, then
reversing recent precedent partly on
the basis that it was unstable, violates
the conventions of the legal conversation in several ways.As anyone who
has been engaged in a long-running
dispute can attest, it is just not fair to
claim that a decided principle is undecided simply because the people who
disagreed in the first place continue to
conplain.Yet Justice Kennedy relies on
this evidence to show that Austin is ripe
for overruling: "[I]t has been noted [by
two of us] that 'Austin was a significant
departure from ancient First Amendment principles."' Concurring,Justice
Roberts points out that "the validity of
Austin's rationale-itself adopted over
two 'spirited dissents,'-has proved to be
the consistent subject of dispute among
Members of this Court ever since."
Dissenters may continue to disagree;
what the rules frown on is the claim
that continuing to disagree is destabilizing rather than merely obstinate.The

continued on page 15
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accepts, subject only to IRS restrictions
on nonprofit spending and Buckley's
major purpose test mentioned above.
The concept of an electioneering
communication is also somewhat obsolete, for what organization would bother
with an electioneering communication
when it could expressly advocate?

marginalized as nonprofits, corporations,
and unions flood the political landscape
with new spending in response to the
CU decision.Whether this concern
conies to fruition remains to be seen.
Parties should remain a big player in the
short term.

Conclusion
State political parties
Although the decision has no direct
effect on them, the potential losers in
the wake of CU are political parties.
Many state parties have low-dollar
contribution limits and limited ability
to coordinate with their candidates
under state and local laws.These organizations, however, are permitted to
expressly advocate on behalf of their
candidate within the limits of federal
and state laws.The potential problem is
that parties may find themselves further

The CU decision has created
somewhat of an uproar among those

concerned about increased corporate
influence in the democratic process.
Leaving the discussion about the
sanctity of democracy aside, the 2010
election cycle will be extremely interesting to watch as those corporate

(and union) funds find the path of least
resistance, new players emerge on the
electoral stage, and these new rights are
exercised. C)
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continuedfrom page 9
true ground of this objection to Austin
is expressed by Justice Roberts; the
court must balance "the importance of
having constitutional questions decided
against the importance of having them
decided right."
Finally, the majority harms the legal
conversation by not taking its burden of
persuasion seriously. Rather than rebutting the dissent's argument that the free
speech and free press clauses might be
interpreted to protect different types of
speakersJustice Scalia flatly declares that
"[n]o one thought that is what it meant."
Near the end of his concurrence,
Justice Scalia makes the same irrefutable
contention: "we are therefore simply left
with the question whether the speech
at issue in this case is 'speech' covered
by the First Amendment. No one says
otherwise."
The majority addresses another question, whether narrower grounds might
have been found adequate to decide
the issue, in more depth. But its argu-
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mentation strategy is similar-declare
that the conclusion is undisputed.Thus,
the majority explains why the narrower
arguments were rejected before it
declares the statute unconstitutional
on its face, presumably because there
are cases not before the court in which
the statute would be found unconstitutional.What are those cases?We don't
know because the majority does not tell
us. InsteadJustice Kennedy concludes
that the statute "beyond doubt discloses
serious First Amendment flaws," that it
chills speech that is "beyond all doubt
protected," and that"[a]y other course
of decision would prolong [its] substantial, nation-wide chilling effect."
In sum, the Citizens United majority
substituted certainty for persuasion. On
questions like these, the justices would
better serve the ongoing legal conversation if they heeded Learned Hands
caution that when judges themselves so
sharply disagree, they should not be too

sure of their conclusions. C)
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